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Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance
and Investor Contracts
MICHAEL S. BARR*

1 Introduction

Arbitration is widely used as an effective alternative to litigation in a
variety of contexts in the United States and in many other jurisdictions.
The Supreme Court has touted the benefits of arbitration over litigation,
noting that 'parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the
courts in order to realise the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower
costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert
adjudicators to resolve specialised disputes'. 1 These benefits explain
why arbitration is widely used, for example, in commercial contracts
and labour-management agreements. For commercial actors, arbitration
often has greater flexibility than court proceedings and has long been
considered essential for cross-border transactions. For labour unions and
management, resolving disputes through arbitration 'minimize[s] industrial conflict over worker grievances' and permits the business to continue to run during dispute resolution. 2
In addition to agreements between sophisticated parties, arbitration
clauses are now also nearly ubiquitous in American consumer contracts.
Consumers are typically presented with contracts on a 'take it or leave it'
basis, with no meaningful ability to negotiate over terms. Arbitration
provisions are often not clearly disclosed and, even when disclosed, are
not salient for consumers, who generally do not focus on the importance
of the provisions in the event that a dispute over the contract later arises
* I would like to thank Jessica Kraft and Angela Xu for research assistance. This chapter first
appeared, under the same title and in similar form, in NYU J. of Law & Business, vol. 11,
no. 4, pages 793-817 (2015), and appears here with permission.
1
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Anima/Feeds Int'/ Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
2
Linda J. Demaine and Deborah R. Hensler, "'Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through PreDispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience', 67 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS.

55 (2004), 55.
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and who may mis-forecast the likelihood of being in such a dispute. As
has been pointed out in a variety of contexts, non-salient contract terms
that reduce consumer welfare can be offered without offsetting effects on
price.3 The lack of salience at time of sale also means that there is no
meaningful competition to provide contracts without arbitration provisions or with more consumer-friendly arbitration provisions. Some arbitration proceedings lack the procedural protections and unbiased
arbitrator selection processes essential for fair outcomes. In addition,
many arbitration provisions prohibit written opinions and bar consumers from disclosing any information about the arbitration proceedings
or evidence backing claims from such proceedings. Moreover, arbitration
clauses today typically preclude consumers from banding together in
aggregated actions. The lack of ability to aggregate claims may diminish
consumer access to effective redress, particularly for small-value claims,
and may diminish the deterrent value of private litigation in enforcing
legal norms.
This chapter focuses on the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in a subset of consumer contracts - those involving consumer
finance and investor products and services. Arbitration clauses are pervasive in financial contracts - for credit cards, bank accounts, auto loans,
broker-dealer services, and many others. In the wake of the recent
financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). 4 Dodd-Frank
authorises the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 5
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 6 to prohibit or
condition the use of arbitration clauses in consumer finance and investment contracts, respectively.
This chapter outlines the need for increased regulation over mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses and suggests the need for key
reforms. This paper begins by exploring arbitration clauses in consumer
finance and investor contracts and then highlights the problems caused
3

4

5

6

See, e.g. Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, 'The Case for Behaviorally
Informed Regulation' in David Moss and fohn Cisternino (eds.), New Perspectives on
Regulation (The Tobin Project, 2009), 25, 41.
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 1-1601, 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641 (2013).
Dodd-Frank Act § 1028. The author served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Financial Institutions, 2009-2010, and was responsible for developing and working with
Congress to enact Dodd-Frank, including the relevant provisions discussed in this article.
Dodd-Frank Act§ 921.
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by mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. A full treatment of potential solutions to these problems is beyond the scope of this chapter.
2

Background

2.1

History

Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925.7 The
Supreme Court has ascribed this statute a broad purpose, perceiving it
as a 'congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favouring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural
policies to the contrary'. 8 The Supreme Court has not only all but
foreclosed state regulation of arbitration agreements, but it has also
severely limited access to the courts generally for consumers seeking to
challenge arbitration agreements.
The FAA provides that agreements to arbitrate 'shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract'. 9 Under this exception to enforceability, states tried to regulate the use of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts, but the Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory carve-out
very narrowly, noting that the FAA was enacted '[t]o overcome judicial
resistance to arbitration' .10 State courts tried to use the doctrine of
unconscionability to set aside arbitration provisions that violated the
state's procedural and substantive norms. The Supreme Court, however,
has repeatedly upheld the validity of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts. The court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
pre-empts a wide swath of state legislative and judicial efforts at regulation that, in the Supreme Court's view, interfered with the ability of
commercial firms to use mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts. 11
The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA broadly to uphold the
enforceability of arbitration clauses. Even fraud in the formation of
the contract is not grounds for evading arbitration; fraud must be
found specifically in the formation of the arbitration clause itself. 12
7

8

9
10

11
12

9 u.s.c. § 1 (1947).

Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. l, 24 (1983).
9 u.s.c. § 2 (1947).

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
E.g. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-406 (1967) ('[T]he
federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that the

2
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Additionally, the arbitrators, not the courts, determine the arbitrability of
the underlying dispute. 13 Even where state courts have been inclined to
explore whether arbitration clauses are unconscionable, delegation
clauses allow parties to delegate the decision about an arbitration clause's
unconscionability to an arbitrator. 14 Most controversially, perhaps, the
Supreme Court has ruled that arbitration clauses can exclude class-action
arbitration or litigation. 15
The Supreme Court has also narrowly interpreted the grounds for
vacatur. Congress laid out in the FAA four circumstances under which a
court can vacate an arbitral award: ( 1) 'where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means', (2) 'where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators', (3) 'where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct', and (4) 'where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers'. 16 Even the arbitrator's misinterpretation or disregard of the
law is not grounds for vacatur. 17 Instead, the courts have developed the
doctrine of manifest disregard of law, which requires plaintiffs to overcome a high hurdle in the form of a three-part test. 18 To make matters
even more difficult for plaintiffs, the parties are not allowed to

13

14
15

16

17

18

making of the agreement for arbitration ... is not in issue. Accordingly, if the claim is
fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself - an issue which goes to the
making of the agreement to arbitrate - the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But
the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the
inducement of the contract generally' (internal quotation marks omitted).); see also
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-448 (2006).
E.g. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-446 (2006) (noting that
'as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable
from the remainder of the contract' and that 'unless the challenge is to the arbitration
clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first
instance'); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)
(deciding that the primary power to decide arbitrability belongs to either the arbitrators
or the courts as the parties agreed).
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2010).
AT&T Mobile LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). I discuss limitations on
collective relief in arbitration more extensively in Section 3.4.
9 u.s.c. § 10 (2002).
E.g. In re Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing L.P. v. Official Unsecured Creditors'
Comm. of Bayou Group, LLC, No. 10-5049-CV, 2012 WL 2548927 (2d Cir. July 3,
2012); United Paperworkers Int'/ Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) ('But as
long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision'.).
E.g., In re Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing L.P. v. Official Unsecured Creditors'
Comm. of Bayou Group, LLC, No. 10-5049-CV, 2012 WL 2548927 (2d Cir. July 3,
2012) (applying the three-part test: (1) the court must determine whether the law that
was allegedly ignored was clear, and explicitly applicable to the matter before the
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supplement grounds for vacatur in the contract, 19 so the arbitration
clause itself cannot stipulate that mere legal error is sufficient to trigger
judicial review.
2.2

The Dodd-Frank Act's New Authority to Regulate Arbitration

After the recent financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (hereafter DoddFrank).20 Bucking the trend towards greater enforcement of arbitration
clauses, Congress gave the new CFPB and the SEC the respective authority to regulate and even prohibit the use of arbitration clauses in consumer finance 21 and investment contracts. 22 Thus, Congress has
provided clear and unambiguous legislative authority to these financial
regulatory agencies to regulate arbitration agreements in these contracts.
To date, however, neither the CFPB nor the SEC has taken regulatory
action under these broad authorities, but the CFPB has already flatly
banned arbitration clauses in mortgage contracts and for whistleblowers,
as required under the act. 23
2.3 Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Finance and Investor
Contracts Today

2.3.1 Consumer Finance Contracts
Dodd-Frank instructed the CFPB to 'conduct a study of ... the use of
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between
covered persons and consumers in connection with the offering or
providing of consumer financial products or services'. 24 In December

19

20
23

24

arbitrators; (2) the court must find that the law was improperly applied; and (3) the court
must find that the arbitrator possessed the subjective intent to disregard the law).
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008). However, parties may
be able to alter the scope of judicial review in state courts. Cable Connection, Inc. v.
DirecTV, 44 Cal. 4th 1334 (Cal. 2008).
22
Dodd-Frank Act§§ 1-1601. 21 Ibid.,§ 1028.
Ibid.,§ 921.
The CFPB has issued rules flatly barring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
residential mortgage loan contracts and home equity lines of credit, as required by DoddFrank. Dodd-Frank Act§ 1414(e). Whistleblowers are also protected under Dodd-Frank
against any reduction in their rights to legal redress pursuant to mandatory arbitration
provisions. Ibid., § 748 (providing protections to whistleblowers reporting to the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission); Ibid., § 922 (providing protection to whistleblowers reporting to the SEC).
Ibid.,§ 1028(a).
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2013, the CFPB issued a preliminary report on pre-dispute arbitration
clauses, 25 and followed up with a second study in March 2015. 26
Arbitration clauses appear in contracts representing 50.2 per cent of
outstanding credit card loans, 58.8 per cent of checking accounts, and 83
per cent of general purpose reloadable (GPR) prepaid cards. 27 Currently,
nearly all consumer financial contracts include no-class arbitration provisions. 28 Larger financial institutions are more likely to use arbitration
clauses than smaller ones. 29 This holds true across all products and
services the CFPB studied. To illustrate, only 7.7 per cent of banks
include arbitration clauses in checking account contracts, yet 44 per
cent of checking accounts are subject to arbitration clauses. 30
Currently, 53 per cent of credit card loans contain arbitration clauses in
the agreement. 31 However, this figure is artificially deflated because
several large issuers settled an antitrust class action by agreeing to remove
arbitration clauses for a defined period. If these issuers reinstate arbitration clauses once the period expires, then approximately 94 per cent of
outstanding credit cards will be subject to arbitration clauses. 32 As
another example, 81 per cent of prepaid cards, which are often used by
lower-income consumers, are subject to arbitration clauses. 33
2.3.2 Broker-Dealer Agreements
As with its recommendations on consumer finance contracts, the
Treasury Department recommended in its 2009 financial reform
25

26

27

31

Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study Preliminary Results: Section
1028(a) Study Results to Date (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20l3l2_cfpb_ar
bitration-study-prelirninary-results.pdf. Industry pushback has been understandably
fierce, given the stakes. Many financial institutions and law firms have vociferously
criticised the CFPB's report. See, e.g. Christine A. Scheunernan, Joseph T. Lynyak III,
and Amy L. Pierce, CFPB's Arbitration Study-A Warning to Consumer Financial Service
Companies, Pillsbury (8 January 2014), www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/cfpbs-arbi
tration-study-a-warning-to-consumer-financial-service-companies ('In point of fact,
however, while the tone of the Study appears to be somewhat hostile to the use of
arbitration clauses, an objective reading of the research indicates that the conflict resolution system that has developed is working well'.); Michael Mallow and Christine Reilly,
The CFPB's Unfair and Misleading Report on Arbitration, Law 360 (24 January 2014),
www.law360.com/articles/50265l/the-cfpb-s-unfair-and-misleading-report-onarbitration.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, pursuant
to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act§ 1028(a) (2015), http://
files.consurnerfinance.gov /f/201503 _ cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.
pdf [hereinafter CFPB Arbitration Study].
Ibid., at 19-28. 28 Ibid., at 10. 29 Ibid., at 19. 30 Ibid., at 25-26.
33
Ibid., at 9-10. 32 Ibid., at l l.
Ibid., at 27.
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proposal that the SEC prohibit or condition mandatory arbitration
clauses in broker-dealer and investment adviser agreements. 34 As mentioned above, Dodd-Frank contains the authorization for such a prohibition or condition. 35
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory body governing broker-dealers, is responsible for administering
arbitration between broker-dealers and their clients. 36 The vast bulk of
disputes between broker-dealers and their clients involves arbitration,
and as with consumer arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in investor-broker
contracts. 37 Filed claims can end with an arbitrator award or with a
settlement achieved through direct negotiation or mediation. Between
21 and 23 per cent of cases were decided by arbitrators from 2011 to
2015. 38 During that same time period, 51-55 per cent of cases were
settled via negotiation, and 7-10 per cent via mediation. 39 Also during
that period, the percentage of cases where the customer was awarded
damages decreased from 47 per cent to 41 per cent. 40
There has long been some concern about the process by which FINRA
selects its arbitrators. For claims of $50,000 or less, FINRA appoints one
arbitrator. 41 For claims for more than $50,000 but less than $100,000, the
parties will select an arbitrator and FINRA will appoint that person,
unless the parties agree in writing to three arbitrators. 42 For claims of
more than $100,000, the parties will select and FINRA will appoint three
arbitrators. In the latter two situations, FINRA generates a random list of
arbitrators from its rosters and sends that list to the parties. 43 Each party
34

35
36

37

38

39
41

42

Department of Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuilding
Financial Supervision and Regulation, 72 (2009), www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
Documents/FinalReport_web.pd£.
Dodd-Frank Act§§ 921, 1028.
FINRA, Arbitration Process, www.finra.org/ ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/
Process/.
See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,238,242 (1987) (holding that
the claims under§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and under RICO were
arbitrable per the Federal Arbitration Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson!American
Express, 490 U.S. 477,480 (1989) (holding that the claims under§ 14 of the Securities Act
of 1933 were arbitrable).
FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics, www.finra.org/ ArbitrationAndMediation/
FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/.
Ibid. 40 Ibid.
FINRA, Arbitrator Selection, www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/
Process/ ArbitratorSelection/index.htm.
Ibid. 43 Ibid.
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strikes from the list arbitrators they do not want, and ranks the remaining
choices. FINRA then combines the parties' rankings and appoints the
highest-ranked available arbitrator from each list to serve on the panel.
Critics charge that the arbitrators on FINRA's rosters are biased or
otherwise unqualified. Generally speaking, the pool of arbitrators has
close ties to the financial industry, 44 lacks diversity, 45 and is infrequently
updated. 46
In response to critics and industry concern about the potential for SEC
regulation, in June 2014, FINRA filed a proposed rule change with the
SEC to redefine 'public arbitrators'. 47 Parties can choose whether they
want public arbitrators on their panel or not. Currently, FINRA allows
people who have been out of the securities industry for at least two years
to be classified as public arbitrators as long as they have spent fewer than
twenty years total in the industry. 48 The proposed rule would require
public arbitrators to be at least five years out of industry and would
permanently disqualify professionals who worked longer than fifteen
years total on behalf of industry clients. 49 It also classifies attorneys,
accountants, and other professionals who devote more than 20 per cent
44

45

46

47

48

49

See Matthias Rieker, 'FINRA to Limit Use of Arbitrators with Industry Ties', The Wall
Street Journal (11 February 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000l424052702304l045045
79377300739589882; Mason Braswell, 'FINRA Approves Rule to Redefine Public
Arbitrators', Investment News (13 February 2014), www.investmentnews.com/article/
20 l 40213/FREE/140219936/finra-approves-rule-to-redefine-public-arbitrators; see also
Peter Robison, 'FINRA's Arbitrators: Dubious, Asleep - Sometimes Dead', Bloomberg
Businessweek (24 April 2014), www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-24/finra-seeksreform-for-broker-investor-arbitration-system ('Lawyers complain about ... arbitrators
who are reluctant to make big rulings against the industry because they won't be asked
back').
Mark SchoetfJr., 'PIABA Claims Arbitrator Bias - FINRA Lashes Back', Investment News
(7 October 2014), www.investmentnews.com/article/20141007/FREE/141009934/piabaclaims-arbitrator-bias-finra-lashes-back (noting that most FINRA arbitrators are white
males over sixty who hold advanced degrees, which 'puts them out of touch with the
average investor').
See Robison, 'FINRA's Arbitrators' (observing that FINRA has provided the names of
dead people as potential arbitrators).
Mason Braswell, 'FINRA Approves Rule to Redefine Public Arbitrators', Investment News
(13 February 2014), www.investmentnews.com/article/20140213/FREE/140219936/
finra-approves-rule-to-redefine-public-arbitrators; George H. Friedman, 'The Camel
and the Last Straw or the Frog and the Boiling Water: Pick Your Parable', Securities
Arbitration Commentator (4 August 2014), www.sacarbitration.com/blog/camel-laststraw-frog-boiling-water-pick-parable/.
Mark SchoetfJr., 'FINRA Seeks to Tighten Investor Dispute Rules', Investment News (18
June 2014), www.investmentnews.com/article/20140618/FREE/140619905/finra-seeksto-tighten-investor-dispute-rules.
Ibid.
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of their professional time to representing investors in securities claims as
non-public. In February 2015, the SEC approved the new rule. 5 FINRA
and the SEC have garnered praise for this move, 51 but its actual impact is
not yet clear.
Recently, FINRA rejected a Schwab broker-dealer contract on the
grounds that it contained a bar on class-action litigation. 52 FINRA
reasoned that its rules have long barred such clauses, and that FINRA
Rule 2268(d), promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act, is not
prohibited by the Federal Arbitration Act. 53 Some have speculated that
FINRA rejected the contract in order to avoid provoking the SEC into
using its Dodd-Frank authority to bar mandatory arbitration provisions
altogether. 54

°

2.3.3

Investment Advisers Agreements: No Mandatory
Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty to their clients. 55 Accordingly,
the SEC has long taken the position, even prior to Dodd-Frank, that
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses do not constitute a waiver
of rights provided under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (including
the right to choose the forum, whether arbitration or adjudication, of
dispute resolution), and that investment contracts should disclose this
50

51

52

53

54

55

SEC, 'Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Revisions to the Definitions of
Non-Public Arbitrator and Public Arbitrator', 80 Fed. Reg. l 1695 (4 March 2015).
Mark Schoeff Jr., 'FINRA Proposal on Public Arbitration Wins Praise', Investment News
(3 October 201 0), www.investmentnews.com/ article/20101003/REG/310039991/finraproposal-on-public-arbitration-wins-praise.
Decision, Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co. (Complaint 2011029760201)
(FINRA Board of Governors 24 April 2014). FINRA does not permit class action
arbitration, but requires broker-dealer contracts to permit class action lawsuits.
Ibid.
Ibid. See Letter from Sen. Franken to the SEC, Office of Senator Franken {30 April 2013),
available at www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=238 l; Mark Schoeff Jr, 'States
Urge SEC to Chuck FINRA's Schwab Decision', Investment News (4 May 2013), available
at www.investmentnews.com/ article/20130504/FREE/ 130509954/states- urge-sec-tochuck-finras-schwab-decision; Mark Schoeff Jr. and Mason Braswell, 'Seeing Writing
on Wall from FINRA, Schwab Throws in Towel on Class Action Lawsuit', Investment
News {25 April 2014), www.investmentnews.com/article/20140425/FREE/140429929/see
ing-writing-on-wall-from-finra-schwab-throws-in-towel-on-class;
Susan
Antilla,
'Schwab Case Casts Spotlight on Securities Arbitration and Its Flaws', The New York
Times (4 September 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/schwab-case-castsspotlight -on-securities-arbitration -and-its-flaws/? _r=0.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963) (holding that§
206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 imposed a fiduciary duty on investment
advisers).
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56

fact. However, the SEC took these positions before several Supreme
Court decisions upheld arbitration clauses under the federal securities
laws, and a subsequent federal district court citing those opinions upheld
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in an advisory client agreement. 57
The SEC now has the clear power under Dodd-Frank to prohibit or
restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in these agreements
going forward. 58 At present, investment advisers who deploy mandatory
arbitration clauses may operate in what some see as 'gray area', where
they use arbitration clauses at their own risk. 59 Recently, however, the
SEC is reported to have pressured the Carlyle Group to remove a
mandatory arbitration clause from its initial public offer filing, 60 suggesting that the SEC' s prior views that the fiduciary duty standard already
bars use of these agreements have not changed. Moreover, the SEC is
authorised under Dodd-Frank to harmonise the differing standards of
care for investment advisers and for broker-dealers offering individualised investment advice by requiring that the advice be in the best interest
of the investor. 61 Under that approach, both broker-dealers (when providing individualised advice) and investment advisers would be prohibited from using mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
3

Problems with Arbitration Clauses in Investor and Consumer
Finance Contracts

Proponents of arbitration often note the benefits to arbitration over
litigating, stressing the faster process, reduced costs, and ability to
choose expert adjudicators. 62 For consumers and investors, however,
56

SEC, Staff Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers 44 (2011), www.sec.gov/
news/ studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
57
58
Ibid.
Dodd-Frank Act§ 921.
59
Suzanne Barlyn, 'Do Arbitration Pacts Go Against Clients' Best Interests?', Chicago
Tribune (13 February 2013 ), http:/ /articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-13/news/snsrt-us-arbitration-advisersbre91c1fj-20130213 _ l_mandatory-arbitration-arbitrationagreements-federal-arbitration-law.
6
° Carter Dougherty, 'Consumers May See New Limits on Mandatory Arbitration',
Bloomberg Businessweek (21 May 2012), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-0521/consumers-may-see-new-limits-on-mandatory-arbitration.
61
SEC, 'Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Revisions to the Definitions of
Non-Public Arbitrator and Public Arbitrator',§ vi.
62
E.g. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'! Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010) (citing
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Mitusbishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.
S. 247 (2009); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)).
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the many problems with mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses
often significantly outweigh these benefits. Consumers and investors
are not making any meaningful choice in agreeing to arbitration
clauses. They face a significant imbalance of power in bargaining, if
any such bargaining actually occurs. If a dispute does arise, consumers
and investors often proceed without the advice of counsel and are faced
with a process that is often inadequate and unfair. 63 Furthermore,
arbitration clauses often limit consumers' and investors' access to
collective redress, which meaningfully impedes both recovery and
deterrence.
3.1

Lack of Meaningful Consumer Consent

Even in the best of circumstances, it is hard to believe that consumers give
anything like meaningful consent to arbitration clauses. 64 At the moment
of signing a financial contract, consumers are not focused on dispute
resolution; they are focused on the financial product or service, or more
likely on the underlying thing they are trying to get done by obtaining the
financial product (for example, buying a car). Even if they were focused
on dispute resolution, they are unlikely to be able to forecast the circumstances under which they would find themselves in a dispute or to
understand the ways in which the choice of dispute resolution might
influence the outcome. These problems are compounded by the complexity of arbitration clauses, the lack of clear disclosure of the provisions
(or the clear disclosure alongside many other 'clear' disclosures that seem
more pertinent), and the limited ability of consumers to opt out of
arbitration clauses. Given that consumers pay little or no attention to
arbitration clauses at the time of contracting, competition does not drive
firms to offer contracts without arbitration clauses or with more consumer-friendly arbitration clauses, and importantly, it is unlikely that
these provisions have a significant effect on the price of consumer
financial goods and services. 65
63
64

65

See Section 3.3.
See, e.g. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate 12 (Princeton University Press, 2013) (noting
that consumers often do not even read boilerplate contracts and hypothesizing seven
reasons for that, including a belief that they would not even understand the terms even if
they read them; a lack of awareness of being subject to those terms; and a belief that it
would be unenforceable if it were harmful).
See Russell Korobkin, 'Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability', 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203 (2003), 1253 n. 189.
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3.1.1 Complexity of Arbitration Clauses
The CFPB analysed the complexity of arbitration clauses in credit card
contracts by measuring clause length, readability, and grade level. 66 It
found that the average arbitration clause comprised 14.1 per cent of the
words in the contract and consisted of 1,108.8 words. 67 The average grade
level (which translates total words, total sentences, and total syllables into
the level of education required to understand the text) for the arbitration
clauses averaged 15.6.68 This score indicates that the text is best understood by those with some college education. In contrast, the average
grade level for the remainder of the contract was 11.6, which roughly
corresponds to a high school-level education. 69 The meaning of delegation or anti-severability clauses, for example, likely escapes most readers.
The length and complexity of arbitration clauses makes consumers less
likely to understand (or even to read) them.
3.1.2 Limited Consumer Ability to Opt Out
Some arbitration clauses give consumers the ability to opt out of or
reject the arbitration clause within a defined time period, but they
appear only in a small share of agreements,7° and their exercise is
typically subject to restriction. To exercise an opt-out, a consumer
generally must submit a signed writing by mail within thirty or sixty
days. 71 If there are multiple authorised users on the account, they may
each need to submit written consent for the opt-out to be effective. 72
Most consumers are unlikely to exercise the opt-out options because of
hassle factors and an incomplete understanding of the consequences of
their decisions.
3.1.3 Behavioural Factors
Even if consumer contracts better disclosed mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions and permitted consumers to opt out, the problem of
meaningful consumer consent would remain. The use of arbitration
clauses should be not measured against some abstract notion regarding
66
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Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study Preliminary Results, app. A at
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Ibid., at 28 (To put that in perspective, that is two pages of single-spaced text in 12-point
Times New Roman font.)
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rational agents who fully understand the implications of disclosed arbitration provisions, but rather considered alongside empirical evidence
regarding how real human beings actually process information and make
decisions. 73 The empirical evidence is clear that consumers do not read
or understand standard contract terms. 74 It is highly unlikely that consumers find the relevant arbitration terms salient at the time of entering
into the contract. Consumers routinely underestimate the likelihood of
financial firms violating the law in a way that would affect them. 75
Moreover, they are highly unlikely to understand the consequences of
different choices of forum or law.

3.2 Imbalance of Power
A significant proportion of consumers go through the arbitration process
without legal representation, whereas companies never do. From 2010 to
2012, 53 per cent of consumers had counsel in AAA arbitrations reviewed
by the CFPB. 76 This percentage drops to 42 per cent in debt collection
proceedings. 77 In contrast, companies 'almost always' retained outside or
in-house counsel in both debt collection and non-collection arbitrations.78 With lawyers representing companies, the purported benefits of
an informal, low-cost proceeding are largely dissipated.
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Additionally, most arbitration clauses contain carve-outs for small
claims court. 79 Small claims carve-outs exclude from arbitration claims
that could be or had been brought in small claims court. These carve-outs
are neutral in theory and have the potential to benefit consumers significantly. However, small claims court carve-outs are 'significantly more
likely' to be used by credit card issuers to sue consumers rather than the
other way around. so

3.3 Procedural Barriers to Full and Fair Adjudication
In addition to the problem of whether or not consumers can be considered to have actually consented to arbitration, there are procedural
barriers within arbitration itself, as it is often currently conducted, that
may lead to substantively unfair outcomes.
3.3.1 Lack of Transparency
Arbitrators are not required to issue written opinions explaining their
decisions. 81 This lack of transparency creates several problems for consumers. First, it prevents parties from understanding how the arbitrator
arrived at his decision. 82 The absence of a written record also makes it
harder for the consumer to prove whether the arbitrator has displayed a
manifest disregard oflaw when seeking judicial review. Furthermore, this
opacity precludes the application of stare decisis, which in any event does
not generally apply to arbitration. Since arbitrators have no body of
precedent to consult, arbitration awards may suffer from unpredictability
and lack of uniformity.
While arbitrators are of course free to issue written decisions, institutional factors often weigh against them doing so. Financial institutions
retain control over drafting arbitration clauses, and contracts for consumer
financial products and services will rarely require arbitrators to issue
reasoned opinions. Moreover, the American Arbitration Association
79
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(AAA) Commercial Rules and the Uniform Arbitration Act contain a
presumption that a reasoned opinion shall not be issued unless the parties
,
83
so require.
Moreover, arbitration clauses often contain various forms of confidentiality or 'gag' rules that prevent consumers from disclosing arbitration
outcomes, or from revealing evidence used in the arbitration process, or
from otherwise disparaging companies with whom they are in dispute.
As a result, arbitration may result in hiding information from the public
even when widespread and serious legal violations that gave rise to the
arbitration proceeding may have occurred.
3.3.2 Selection of Arbitrators
The ability of the parties to choose their own arbitrator is touted as an
advantage because parties can theoretically choose a mutually acceptable,
impartial person or panel possessing relevant expertise. Commonly, the
arbitration clause stipulates an arbitration organization such as the AAA,
which is currently the predominant administrator for consumer arbitration about credit cards, checking accounts, and GPR prepaid cards. 84 The
arbitration organization then determines the pool of prospective arbitrators, if not the actual arbitrator(s). 85 Professional arbitrators can be
preferable to judges due to their subject-area expertise, and they are
generally bound by codes of conduct, as are AAA arbitrators, to ensure
neutrality. However, arbitrators may be biased if they are affiliated with
the industry that is the subject of the dispute. Even when arbitrators are
truly neutral, the perception of unfairness may lead consumers to lose
faith in the process.
There have been notorious examples of highly biased arbitration
organizations, such as the National Arbitration Forum, that were essentially working on behalf of debt collection agencies and offering 'neutral'
arbitration services that were in the interests of the debt collection
firms. 86 NAF has since been forced to terminate its consumer arbitration
services. The current market leader in consumer arbitrations, AAA, has
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voluntarily agreed not to hear firm-initiated debt collection cases on the
grounds that its own inquiry into such arbitrations gave it serious doubt
about the fairness of the process. 87
A recent study of securities arbitration found that the arbitrator's
background had a significant impact on arbitration outcomes. 88 For
example, industry experience tends to decrease arbitral awards for claimants. The influence of arbitrator background on outcomes is tempered,
however, when claimants are represented by counsel in the arbitral
proceedings. 89
3.3.3 Limits on Damages
Arbitration clauses can limit consumers' ability to recover damages in a
number of ways. Oftentimes, arbitration clauses preclude the award of
punitive damages or consequential damages, or both.90 Alternatively,
they may specify strict guidelines for the arbitrator to follow in calculating the award. 91 Some type of limitation on damages appears in 15 per
cent of credit card contracts with arbitration clauses and over 60 per cent
of both checking account and prepaid card contracts with arbitration
clauses. 92

3.4

Collective Redress and the Interplay between Public and Private
Enforcement

3.4.1 The Role of Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Clauses in Thwarting Efforts for Collective Redress
Arbitration clauses increasingly bar access to collective redress. 93 Class
proceedings are essential for effective redress of many small value legal
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claims. 94 Class action arbitration, like class action litigation, solves the
problem that occurs when a company's practice defrauds many people,
but individual lawsuits would be impracticable because each consumer
could only hope to recover a relatively minor amount. Though the
amount is negligible for each individual, the error adds up to a significant
windfall for the company, and the lack of collective redress diminishes
the deterrent value of private litigation in shaping corporate behaviour.
For those reasons, the California Supreme Court struck down waivers
of class arbitration in adhesive contracts as unconscionable, in the
Discover Bank rule. 95 The US Supreme Court, however, held in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion that the FAA pre-empted the Discover Bank rule,
with the result that class arbitration waivers are not permitted to be ruled
unconscionable under state law, at least not under similar facts and
circumstances. 96 The Court reasoned that class-wide arbitration sacrifices 'the principal advantage of arbitration - its informality - and makes
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural
morass than final judgment'. 97 Concepcion has been widely decried for its
negative impact on public access to justice.98
3.4.2 Reduced Private Enforcement
Class proceedings are critical components of the mix of public and
private enforcement of many legal norms. Many consumer financial
protection statutes contemplate that class proceedings will be conducted
to enforce those norms. 99 '[Wle have come to assume, quite correctly,
that private actors will be the frontline enforcers in actions redressing
broadscale securities fraud, consumer fraud and deceptive trade
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practices, ... and many other areas'. 100 Penalty levels set by statute
necessarily contemplate a given mix of public and private enforcement.
Thus, if consumer class relief were not available, penalty levels (and the
extent of public enforcement) would need to be increased to achieve the
same overall level of enforcement. 101
The traditional use of private litigation to enforce individual rights in
the United States has become increasingly supplemented with public
enforcement. Recently, the United States 'increasingly relies on states
attorneys general, federal prosecutors, agencies, and legislative compensation to compensate victims on a massive scale' as reformers have
moved for a focus on victims' rights. 102 Although it is true that there
has been an emerging trend in America towards increased public enforcement, private litigation is still an essential enforcement mechanism. 103
It is, moreover, an important check on lax public enforcement. 104
Notably, even many European countries, long considered to be focused
on civil enforcement over private litigation, have adopted increasingly
expansive collective redress procedures. In fact, there has been a 'convergence' in how the United States and the European countries have
attended to collective redress. 105 This demonstrates that the ideal mix of
public and private enforcement is fluid and can change over time.
However, Congress has legislated against a backdrop of enforcement
policies and has established many privately actionable statutory schemes
that depend on individuals bringing suit, individually and collectively,
for enforcement. 106
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4 Arbitration Agreements in Other Contexts
The use of arbitration agreements in other contexts informs the use of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.
Arbitration agreements in the labour context are individually negotiated
between sophisticated parties and are highly touted as beneficial for both
sides. Arbitration agreements are also used by commercial actors, but,
surprisingly, much less used for commercial disputes by the very same
firms that impose mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements on
consumers.
4.1

Labour Agreements

Collective bargaining agreements often feature mandatory arbitration
provisions. Both labour unions and management are sophisticated parties who individually negotiate for these provisions. Both parties believe
that dispute resolution through arbitration causes less friction than
litigation. 107 Additionally, both parties have more trust in arbitrators
that the parties have selected themselves and tend to have more expertise
in labour relations than judges with only general knowledge. 108 Labour
unions and management also have similar goals in maintaining a strong
and competitive business, and so both stress 'a conflict resolution process
that would keep businesses running and avoid losses in productivity and
employment'. 109
Unlike consumer and investor contracts, collective bargaining agreements are individually negotiated between sophisticated parties with
equal bargaining power. 110 As such, the specific details that are commonly found in these labour agreements can inform what should be
enforced in the consumer context. One of the reasons that labour unions
107
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and management negotiate for arbitration in collective bargaining agreements in the first place is the ability to choose the arbitrator. 111 One key
safeguard for unionised workers is that 'unions and management repeatedly arbitrate and jointly select the arbitrator'. 112 Joint selection helps to
ensure a neutral arbitrator, 113 and repeated arbitration incentivises the
arbitrator 'to perform consistently without favouring one party over the
other' .114 Instead, labour unions and management use the outcomes to
renegotiate the terms of their agreements if they want future outcomes to
differ from the arbitrator's decision. 115 Additional safeguards include: a
duty on both parties to share information 116 and a duty on the union to
fairly represent its workers. 117 The National Labor Relations Act requires
employers to share information throughout the entire arbitration process. In labour arbitrations, arbitrators often write opinions, which allows
for future arbitrators and future parties to explore patterns in prior
adjudications. 118
4.2

Commercial Actors

Notably, the same commercial actors that inflict mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements on their consumers do not choose to bargain for
these agreements in other contracts. One study found that with large
public corporations, over 75 per cent of the studied consumer agreements imposed mandatory arbitration of disputes, yet less than 10 per
cent of their 'negotiated nonconsumer, non-employment contracts'
included arbitration clauses. 119 The authors concluded that '[t]he
absence of arbitration provisions in the great majority of negotiated
business contracts suggests that companies value, even prefer, litigation
as the means for resolving disputes with peers' .120 They further noted that
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'[t]he systematic eschewing of arbitration clauses in business-to-business
contracts also casts doubts on the corporations' asserted beliefs in the
superior fairness and efficiency of arbitration clauses'. 121 It appears,
therefore, that at least some commercial actors may be using arbitration
clauses against consumers for the strategic advantages it provides. Those
strategic advantages are diminished, however, when dealing with other
sophisticated parties. This is shown in the revealed preferences of large
companies, which choose arbitration with consumers but prefer litigation for business-to-business disputes.
5 Conclusion
Although arbitration can provide some benefits over litigation in a
variety of commercial contexts, consumers are often subject to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses that diminish their legal protections,
reduce recoveries, and attenuate deterrence. It can hardly be said that
consumers meaningfully consent to such arrangements, and so it has
often been left to courts to police these provisions through doctrines such
as unconscionability. Over the years, the Supreme Court has significantly
cabined the ability of courts to exercise this critical oversight role. In
2010, however, Congress stepped in through the passage of Dodd-Frank
to provide the authority for the CFPB and SEC to prohibit or condition
the use of arbitration agreements in consumer finance and investor
contracts, respectively.
The CFPB and SEC should use this authority to prohibit or condition
contractual requirements on consumers and investors to arbitrate. At a
minimum, significant conditions on arbitration agreements are needed.
These include both up-front protections, including prominent disclosures and easy methods to opt out of arbitration at any time, as well as
protections embedded in arbitration processes that are used in consumer
finance and investor contract disputes, to ensure that they provide a fair
and efficient method for resolving claims. In addition, the agencies
should bar provisions in consumer finance and investor contracts that
limit the ability to seek collective relief or otherwise inhibit full redress of
consumer and investor claims. In fact, the CFPB has signalled its intent to
propose rules that would move in just that direction. 122 While this
121
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Small Business Advisory Review Panel for
Potential Rulemaking on Arbitration Agreements, Outline of Proposals Under
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CONCLUSION

chapter does not provide the space necessary to work out these proposals
in detail, continued progress on regulating arbitration clauses is essential
for protecting consumers and investors from abuse and for supporting
financial markets with integrity.
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